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INTRODUCTION 
Each of the articles included in this symposium addresses a critical problem 
of inequality within the criminal justice system, beginning from the moment that 
the criminal law, via police, comes into contact with citizens1 through to its 
continued reach well after, or even without, conviction and sentencing.2 Multiple 
stages of process are examined here, including detention,3 criminal charging by 
prosecutors,4 jury trials,5 and prison disciplinary practices that occur postsentence.6 
The authors are concerned with how disadvantages fall upon marginalized 
communities, namely the poor, persons of color, and women. These disadvantages 
can occur when members of these communities are suspected of, charged with, or 
convicted of crimes as well as when they are victims of crime. 
Each article also asserts a theory about how or why inequality occurs in the 
 
* Professor of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine. 
1. See Eric J. Miller, Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735 (2015). 
2. See Lahny R. Silva, Collateral Damage: A Public Housing Consequence of the “War on Drugs,” 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 783 (2015). 
3. See Bryan L. Sykes et al., The Fiscal Savings of Assessing the Right to Legal Counsel Within Twenty-
Four Hours of Arrest: Chicago and Cook County, 2013, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 813 (2015). 
4. See Jonathan Markovitz, “A Spectacle of Slavery Unwilling to Die”: Curbing Reliance Upon Racial 
Stereotyping in Self-Defense Cases, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 873 (2015). 
5. See Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843 (2015); 
Markovitz, supra note 4. 
6. See Andrea C. Armstrong, Race, Prison Discipline, and the Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 759 
(2015). 
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particular site of analysis, either implicitly or explicitly. In my comments, I want to 
examine these theoretical assertions to offer a more holistic and comprehensive 
model of institutional inequality, as exists in the U.S. criminal system. In Section I, 
I offer a reading of each article in this symposium as to how it frames the problem 
of racial and other inequities in the given site of inquiry and what it offers by way 
of remedial intervention. In Section II, I briefly delineate the prevailing social 
science theorizing about the problem of racism, especially as applied to legal 
contexts. I then suggest an integrated model that may have more utility in explaining 
and remediating institutionalized bias in the criminal justice system. I conclude by 
asking whether this model might generate further possibilities for intervention in 
the sites interrogated by the symposium articles. 
I. THE ASSERTIONS 
Eric Miller begins his analysis at the point of police encounters, wherein 
(typically) beat officers intervene with members of the public in interactions that 
range from “the non- or minimally-intrusive (such as ‘exchanges of pleasantries or 
mutually useful information’7), up to the very intrusive (such as asking for 
identification, following an individual for an extended period of time, or 
questioning them).”8 Miller leaves aside the question of how members of the public 
are identified and selected for encounters, focusing instead on how those selected 
are treated once encountered.9 Miller argues that contestation against police 
encounters has the potential to strengthen democratic institutions, but that this 
strategy can differentially harm those who contest, depending upon their own 
identities. Specifically, he suggests that “minorities and the poor”10 are especially 
likely to be mistreated when they contest encounters. He offers a two-part 
explanation for why this is so. First, he turns to the prevailing individual-level 
explanation of racism—implicit bias—to explain that officers are not immune from 
cognitive biases that make them view minorities as more hostile, aggressive, and 
criminally involved.11 Thus, he argues, the encounter is more likely to happen to 
minority members of the public, and minority members’ contestation of the 
encounter will be interpreted by police as more hostile than it will for contestations 
by white members of the public.12 Second, he suggests that contestation by 
members of subjugated groups, especially women, escalates the gravity of the 
encounter under the prevailing conditions of authoritarian policing.13 While he does 
not offer an intervention into the identified problem of implicit bias, he does argue 
 
7. Miller, supra note 1, at 736 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
8. Id. at 736. 
9. See id. at 739–44. 
10. Id. at 750. 
11. See id. at 753. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. at 753–54. 
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that reorienting policing away from its authoritarian stance might mitigate against 
the escalation of contested encounters.14 
Andrea Armstrong also relies substantially on implicit bias theory as an 
explanation for racially discriminatory problems at the other end of the criminal 
system. She goes behind prison walls to examine how staff judgments about 
disciplinary rule violations are shaped by prisoners’ racial identity.15 Armstrong, like 
Miller, views the interpretation of words, behavior, and nonverbal cues for possible 
rule violations by an authority figure (here a correctional staff member) as 
potentially tainted by implicit bias.16 She argues that, in particular, ambiguously 
defined disciplinary rules, such as those governing inmate attitudes and demeanor, 
can be and are differentially applied depending upon the racial identity of the 
suspected rule violator.17 Additionally, once identified as rule violators, nonwhite 
inmates are likely to be punished more severely due to biased perceptions of the 
seriousness of the underlying offense.18 Further, according to Armstrong, the law 
facilitates racial inequality in the prison disciplinary context by upholding the 
constitutionality of vague and ambiguous rules, contributing to an environment ripe 
for the influence of implicit bias.19 Rather than recommending a specific 
intervention for the problems she identifies, Armstrong calls for more data 
collection and analysis to establish more conclusively the role of implicit bias in 
disciplinary violation outcomes.20 
Cynthia Lee and Jonathan Markovitz are both primarily concerned with the 
potential for biases to influence adjudication processes, especially in the case of 
jurors as fact finders and decision makers. They examine cases in which criminal 
defendants rely upon negative stereotypes that portray black homicide victims as 
dangerous or threatening in an effort to justify the killing. Each author begins with 
an iconic contemporary case that exemplifies how this can happen: Markovitz uses 
the killing of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman in Sanford, Florida to propel 
his analysis,21 and Lee opens with Michael Brown’s killing by Officer Darren Wilson 
in Ferguson, Missouri.22 Consistent with Armstrong and Miller’s articles, Markovitz 
and Lee agree on the source of the problem. Both argue that implicit racial bias and 
negative stereotypes can powerfully shape how fact finders interpret and assess 
evidence in criminal cases, and both assert that court actors can and do prey upon 
these biases as an adversarial strategy.23 They also agree that there is a need for 
 
14. See id. at 756–57. 
15. See Armstrong, supra note 6, at 762–73. 
16. See id. at 764–68. 
17. See id. at 770–72. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 773–78. 
20. See id. at 781–82. 
21. See Markovitz, supra note 4. 
22. Lee, supra note 5, at 843–46. 
23. Id. at 863–69; Markovitz, supra note 4, at 927–30. 
Lynch_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 12/11/2015  11:08 PM 
938 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:935 
 
intervention to mitigate this problem.24 While they differ over what kind of 
remediation would be most effective, both maintain the individualistic, cognitive 
theoretical approach in crafting their interventions. 
Lee argues that using voir dire to explicitly discuss the problem of bias, thereby 
making race salient for jurors, can remediate against the effects of bias.25 Under this 
interventional model, putting jurors on notice about “racial issues” that are inherent 
in the case and/or identifying racial bias as a potential problem for jurors will help 
inoculate them against the influence of unconscious biases that they may hold.26 
Markovitz further calls for an affirmative instruction to jurors, based on the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of “badges or incidents of slavery,” that as a 
matter of law, it is unreasonable to rely upon racial stereotypes “to determine the 
nature of a violent threat” in self-defense cases.27 He also recommends developing 
“methods of actively patrolling for legal actors who rely upon racial stereotypes, 
consciously or not.”28 
Conversely, the articles by Lahny Silva and Bryan Sykes, Eliza Solowiej, and 
Evelyn Patterson implicate structural conditions, both within and beyond the 
system, in producing inequalities.29 Neither of these articles explicitly articulates a 
theory of how inequality is produced, but implicit in each is a model of its 
production. Sykes et al. are concerned foremost with fiscal costs associated with 
excessive pretrial detention in Cook County, Illinois.30 Yet they make clear that this 
county’s system of managing suspects in the earliest stages of custodial detention, 
prior to formal charges being filed, not only contributes to added expenses for the 
county. It also produces injustices for detained suspects.31 In this case, detainees 
have the right, in theory, to representation during interrogation, but the procedure 
in place bars most suspects from actually exercising that right prior to formal court 
proceedings.32 This denial especially impacts poor defendants because public 
defenders, as a matter of policy, may not be appointed to represent defendants until 
the initial court appearance.33 One consequence for justice, argue Sykes and his 
colleagues, is a higher risk of faulty convictions as defendants are compelled to 
waive their rights and submit to coercive interrogations without counsel. The 
authors also point to the potentially devastating disruption of work and family 
obligations that comes with sustained pretrial detention as a collateral injustice 
 
24. Lee, supra note 5, at 866–69; Markovitz, supra note 4, at 926–33. 
25. Lee, supra note 5. 
26. Id. 
27. Markovitz, supra note 4, at 877. 
28. Id. 
29. See Silva, supra note 2; Sykes et al., supra note 3. 
30. Sykes et al., supra note 3, at 829. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 817. 
33. Id. 
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produced by this policy.34 Thus, Sykes et al. identify an institutionalized barrier, 
rather than biased individuals, as a causal force in inequality and injustice and offer 
a structural reform—appointment of counsel at initial detention—as the 
appropriate intervention. 
Silva, as well, pinpoints policy—on the books and in practice—as the core 
problem underlying inequities in public housing. While she does not make an 
explicit claim about race, gender, or class bias in her contribution, she details how 
the policy of excluding otherwise eligible persons from public housing for their own 
or other household members’ “drug-related criminal activity” negatively impacts 
those so identified.35 Specifically, she points to the enormous amount of discretion 
built into federal law and bestowed upon local public housing authorities to define 
and determine what constitutes actionable drug-related activity and who constitutes 
“household members” as responsible for producing systemic inequities.36 Given the 
nature of the problem as she has identified it, her remedial intervention is also 
systemic, that is, to impose procedural standards adapted from criminal law. This 
would, in her view, set a higher evidentiary bar for finding criminal activity and offer 
protections to the accused households under the Fourth Amendment.37 The 
examples Silva provides in the article sketch a portrait of those who have been 
subject to seemingly unreasonable evictions under existing policy. Caregivers, 
primarily women, are held responsible for behavior of others even when that 
behavior would be very difficult to detect.38 Consequently, whole families lose their 
homes, sometimes based on activity that took place miles away, years prior, or by 
relative strangers to the leaseholder.39 
II. WHAT IS RACIAL BIAS? 
The articles in this symposium replicate a bit of a theoretical divide in the social 
scientific literature about the nature and mechanisms of racial bias, inequality, and 
discrimination, that is, between individual-level, psychologically based explanations 
and group- or structural-level explanations more prevalent in sociology. The 
“implicit bias” line of theorization that is featured in the majority of these articles 
emerged from a subfield of psychology, social cognition, and currently dominates 
the discipline as an explanation of racism.40 Generally, social cognition research 
suggests that “[m]any mental processes function implicitly, or outside conscious 
attentional focus.”41 Stereotypes, which are conceptualized as categorization 
 
34. Id. at 833. 
35. See Silva, supra note 2. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 810. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 799. 
40. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006). 
41. Id. at 947. 
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heuristics, and biases, which also include an evaluative component, are among those 
mental processes that can operate in such a manner.42 Thus, under the predominant 
implicit cognition model, racial bias is pervasive, even among those in subjugated 
groups, but it operates outside of the conscious control of those holding the bias.43 
The most well-known method for measuring implicit racial stereotypes and biases 
is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which uses timed tests of association 
between race-based “attitude objects” and positive or negative terms.44 Some 
evidence exists that implicit bias can predict discriminatory behavior under some 
circumstances,45 however the cognition-behavior relationship is not very robust.46 
The discipline of sociology has not fully embraced the individual-level, 
“implicit bias” model as an explanation for discriminatory outcomes. As an 
epistemological matter, this is unsurprising given sociology’s concern with groups 
rather than individuals as units of analysis. Within sociology and the subfield of 
criminology, racially disparate outcomes are more commonly explained by variants 
of conflict theory, which posits that when minority groups threaten or challenge the 
majority group’s power, the majority group uses its institutional resources (such as 
the criminal justice system) to impede that effort.47 This line of theorization, then, 
seeks to identify which groups control power and resources, as well as to pinpoint 
the kinds of structural resources, like laws, policies, and capital, that are wielded to 
maintain power. Empirical tests of conflict theory typically examine the relationship 
between various measures of minority group threat and aggregated measures of 
political, legal, and economic power.48 
As I have argued previously, in order to understand and remediate the 
pervasive inequalities in the criminal system, the ongoing tussle between the 
sociological and psychological approaches needs to be resolved.49 Thus, I proposed 
an integrated theory that incorporates individual-, group-, and structural-level 
understandings of racism, since not one level of analysis can adequately explain the 
 
42. David M. Amodio & Patricia G. Devine, Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: 
Evidence for Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 
655 (2006). 
43. See generally Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 
18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007). 
44. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-
Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 18 (2009). 
45. Id. at 32. 
46. See generally id. (reporting relatively small correlations between measures of implicit and 
explicit bias and behavioral outcomes). 
47. HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 116 
(1967). For a test in the criminal justice context, see also David Eitle, Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa 
Stolzenberg, Racial Threat and Social Control: A Test of the Political, Economic, and Threat of Black Crime 
Hypotheses, 81 SOC. FORCES 557 (2002). 
48. BLALOCK, supra note 47, at 119. 
49. Mona Lynch, Institutionalizing Bias: The Death Penalty, Federal Drug Prosecutions, and Mechanisms 
of Disparate Punishment, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 92 (2013). 
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multiple processes that give rise to racial inequality in complex social systems.50 I 
first documented the shortcomings of the mainstream psychological model, which 
inadequately accounts for situational, contextual, and structural forces that impinge 
upon the individual’s autonomy to act.51 Indeed, the bulk of psychological research 
on implicit bias seems to assume that the behavior that results from biased 
cognitions is relatively unconstrained, discounting the large body of social research 
indicating that forces external to the individual powerfully shape individual action, 
more so than internal cognitions under many conditions.52 Nonetheless, much of 
the implicit bias research maintains the atomized individual-level approach. As a 
consequence, “the ‘group’ or the ‘organization’ is simply the additive sum of its 
individual members, so identifying and taming individuals’ level of bias will solve 
the problem of group-based or organizational-level discriminatory decision 
making.”53 
In macrolevel models, the sociological version of racism is also incomplete, 
but for very different reasons. The individual is not well theorized, if at all, and 
action can seem to have no agent whatsoever propelling it. Reading into sociological 
theorizations of racism for a theory of the person, there is often an implicit 
conception of the individual as a rational actor whose actions are driven by clearly 
defined (and rational) interests. Moreover, the mechanisms by which racism 
happens are under-theorized in many empirical and theoretical macrolevel 
treatments, so the causal process between, say, “threat” on one end of the 
hypothesis and discriminatory outcomes on the other is a bit of a black box.54 
For a robust theory of how bias occurs and persists in institutional settings 
like those that constitute the criminal justice system, the individual actor needs to 
be embedded in the institutional setting in which she operates. This requires 
thinking through how people and their environments interact to produce outcomes, 
including the kinds of troubling outcomes detailed in this symposium’s set of 
articles. In order to do this, we must first clearly articulate the institutional 
parameters, including the institution’s stated missions, policies, decision-making 
criteria and processes, and rules and regulations, as well as the less formal norms 
and ideological paradigms that comprise the setting and define the universe of 
possibility for organizational actions and responses. We also must delineate the 
 
50. Id. at 107–08. 
51. Id. at 110–11. 
52. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991). A good example from the social psychology of 
intergroup relations is that of “stereotype threat.” Numerous studies have demonstrated that persons 
subject to racial or other stereotypes can be situationally “cued” that others see them stereotypically, 
and their behavior then conforms to the stereotype. For a review and summary of this body of research, 
see CLAUDE STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 
(2011). 
53. Lynch, supra note 49, at 111. 
54. Id. at 111–12. 
Lynch_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 12/11/2015  11:08 PM 
942 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:935 
 
duties, responsibilities, and modes of power inherent in the roles that institutional 
actors are assigned within each organization, as well as how those roles can be 
variably embodied depending upon who is filling them. Finally, we need to identify 
what constitutes outcomes, formally intended or not, within the institutional setting 
in question. 
When thinking about how each of the various organizations within the 
criminal system operate and do business, it becomes clear that some roles will allow 
actors’ biases (implicit or explicit) to have more room for influence; that some 
decision-making criteria and processes provide more opportunity for the decision makers’ 
bias to influence judgments; and that some outcomes will be more or less vulnerable 
to inequities in their distribution. It should also be clear that in most cases it takes 
both actors and organizational conditions to produce a pattern of discriminatory 
outcomes. Yet, as a practical matter, it is more feasible to design remedial 
interventions that change organizational structures than it is to change individual 
cognitions. Both Lee and Markovitz grapple with that very conundrum as they 
debate how to contain and tame biases that are described as pervasively present in 
society and readily available for exploitation by attorneys in criminal cases.55 
Whether by instructing jurors or educating them about racial bias, such 
interventions may mitigate in individual cases, but they cannot address the deep 
structural problems that produce both the interracial violence at issue and the biased 
processes that precede the formal court adjudication processes. 
Conversely, a sole reliance on adding or reforming law and policy, whether to 
heighten legal protections or to decrease ambiguity, will surely have limited remedial 
success without considering how laws and policies are put into action in the specific 
contexts in which they are deployed and by sets of actors who operate according to 
both role demands and more generalized ideologies, explicit and implicit, that shape 
their worldviews. A decades-long line of sociolegal research confirms that the gap 
between “law on the books” and “law in action” is fundamental to legality;56 laws 
always get reshaped on the ground as a function of both proximate and distal forces 
that impinge on agents’ actions.57 This means that reforms must take into account 
the multiple ways laws and policies can be interpreted and deployed within the 
specific contexts of existing, localized criminal justice regimes.58 And it means 
recognizing the adaptability and creativity of human actors to use laws and policies 
in furtherance of their own ends, while dressing up the outcomes to fit within the 
official parameters and goals of the organization. 
 
55. See Lee, supra note 5, at 869–72; Markovitz, supra note 4, at 926–33. 
56. Richard L. Abel, Law and Society: Project and Practice, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 1, 5 (2010). 
57. Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Legal Change and Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker: The 
Impact of Time and Place on Drug Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 411, 416 (2014). 
58. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The articles in this symposium expand the sites of inquiry to reveal evermore 
ways that contemporary American criminal justice systematically produces 
inequalities. Beyond the more well known and talked-about problems of racially 
disparate arrest patterns and sentencing disparities, the articles have detailed 
problems that precede and succeed both of these formal stages of process. More 
critically, they shine much-needed light on some of the darker corners of 
discretionary activity—the critical first moments of contact with the system via 
police encounters, as Miller details;59 the period of legal purgatory before suspects 
become defendants, as Sykes et al. examine;60 the black box of jury decision-making, 
as detailed by Markovitz and Lee;61 the add-on punishment practices that take place 
behind prison walls, as Armstrong elucidates;62 and as Silva describes, a critical 
instance of collateral sanctions that have seeped into the social welfare system: 
public housing exclusions for drug-related criminal activity.63 
In each of these sites, there is a critical need for tailored policy interventions 
that are cognizant of the diverse ways in which they may actually be applied by 
different actors and under different conditions. The authors start us down roads 
that have promise in this regard and open up space for thinking through more 
possibilities for sustainable remediation of the systemic inequalities that are deeply 
entwined with the everyday operation of American criminal justice. 
  
 
59. Miller, supra note 1. 
60. Sykes et al., supra note 3. 
61. Lee, supra note 5; Markovitz, supra note 4. 
62. Armstrong, supra note 6. 
63. Silva, supra note 2, at 796–98. 
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